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2THE FINANCIAL BASE OF THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL ENTERPRISE
ABSTRACT
The article presents an assessment of the capital market for
technology-based firms, focusing upon the links between the
stages of evolution of a firm and the investment preferences of
various capital sources. These factors lead to an expectation that
initial capital will be supplied most frequently by the
entrepreneurs themselves from their own savings, secondarily by
their families and friends and by private investors, all these
being sources of capital outside of the formal channels. More
substantial but still initial funding from rather unique "wealthy
family funds", special "seed" funds and somewhat more
conventional venture capital funds are expected to be the primary
complements of the informal sources.
Data from studies of technological firms support these
expectations, providing evidence of the usual small initial capital
base (almost half with less than $10,000) and the dominance of
personal savings as the principal source of initial capital (74
percent of the companies). "Outside" sources of capital are
responsible for the larger initial investments when they occur.
Larger amounts of initial capital are both contributed and raised
by larger groups of co-founders, especially when the founders are
involved in the companies from the outset on a full-time basis.
Specific plans for the company are associated with greater
initial capitalization, as well as with raising outside capital, as
is also true for the effect of having an initial product. The needs
for initial capital vary enormously by amount and intended use as
a function of the type of business being started, with consulting
firms and software companies requiring far less than hardware
developers and producers.
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Entrepreneurial people provide the initiative, the energy and the vision
for launching a new company. Advanced technology often provides the unique
competitive advantage over existing companies or the basis for creating a
new market. But money provides "the grease", the wherewithal to make it
happen, even for the high technology firm.
In recent years numerous books and articles have been published on how
to manage venture capital investing along with even more publications on how
to raise capital for the new enterprise. But surprisingly few of these works
have been based on careful empirical research (see Dunkelberg and Cooper,
1983, for an exception), and I have found none focused upon the initial funding
of technology-based companies. This article establishes a general background
for understanding the financing of a technological firm by first discussing the
several stages of a company's financial development and the variety of
potential financial sources relevant to the firm. This discussion leads to a
set of expectations or hypotheses as to the initial sources of capital for the
technological enterprise. Empirical studies of several hundred technological
firms provide the data for verifying these expectations, indicating the
sources and extent of initial capital base of the technical enterprise and the
factors affecting this initial financing.
STAGES OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
The new technology-based firm evolves through a succession of
multiple stages of corporate growth and parallel development of its financial
needs. The period of time during which a company can be classified in a
particular phase varies widely among firms and the dividing line between
phases is at best fuzzy. Yet the relative stage of evolution does strongly
influence the type and amount both of capital required and especially of
capital available. To understand this relationship I shall first examine the
general characteristics of the firm at each stage, which in turn imply the
nature of its likely financial backers. Empirical research will later be used
further to illuminate these financing relationships.
Traditionally the technical firm has been visualized as going through a
usually pre-company R&D stage, followed by three phases of corporate
4development: (1) start-up, (2) initial growth, and (3) sustained growth. The
research and development phase often takes place in the laboratory of some
other "source" organization or the basement of a founder's home, often while
the founders are still employed "full time" for another organization. It
involves experimental verification of product principles and may include
attempts to determine commercial applicability. Few resources other than
the founders' time are generally employed at this "pre-venture stage". In
recent years the financial community has become more involved in this
pre-company stage, often with university laboratories or their direct
spinoffs, in the long-term funding of ambitious R&D programs with hoped-for
commercial outcomes. Sometimes the mechanism of an "R&D Limited
Partnership" is employed during this stage, especially in recent years with
biotechnology companies, but the R&D stage (especially R !) remains a largely
pre-corporate or at least unfunded aspect of most new companies' formation
and development. The R&D stage does sometimes overlap with the "zero
stage" of start-up firms, as will be discussed below.
Phase 1 -- Start-up
The start-up phase begins with the founding of the company and ends,
more-or-less, when the company has experienced significant sales (at least a
few hundred thousand dollars per year) and has developed one or more
products or services that exhibit growth potential. In recent years the
start-up phase has been subdivided conceptually into the "seed stage" or "zero
stage" and the "first stage". During the so-called "zero stage", the new
company works out its basic technology, formulates its initial strategy, and
rounds out the start-up team.
At the outset of its "seed phase" the company often lacks an operating
prototype of its intended product and even has little in the way of a formal
business plan. Many companies carry what we described above as a
"pre-company R&D stage" into this "seed phase", continuing to solve key
product development issues and moving toward an operating demonstration
prototype of their initial product. Following the seeding activities is the
more conventional "first stage", during which the company generally has
produced a reasonably well-defined business plan, an emerging organizational
structure built up around several key committed personnel, and a product for
which at least some level of commercial applicability has been demonstrated.
5During the entire start-up phase the new technological firm typically
devotes considerable time to product development. It is dealing with only a
few customers but is actively seeking new marketing/sales channels. The
firm is housed in modest facilities, using barely adequate equipment. It has
little or no available financial collateral. Typically few of the people in the
company have substantial management experience; a large portion of the
founders and their early employees are technical people by education and
work experience. The company is able to react quickly when opportunities
arise. However, the company is usually losing money.
The financial needs of the firm during the start-up phase are many. It
needs capital to finance product development, primarily to support salaries
for the technical personnel, despite the fact that many or all of them are
being paid lower salaries than in their previous jobs, earning by their
financial sacrifice the so-called "sweat equity" ownership in their company.
Some capital is also needed for equipment. Working capital may be required
if the company is already producing products for sale. Since the company is
losing money, the entrepreneur must turn outside the firm for capital.
But what type of investor would be willing to supply initial capital to
such a new company? Since the investment is so risky, the potential payoff
must be high in order to outweigh the high probability of failure. The capital
source must be patient, willing to wait for five to ten years for a return. He,
she or it must trust unproven management to develop, produce, and sell a
product or service that often does not yet exist. Such an investment is
viewed by many as analogous to putting several hundred thousand dollars or
more on the Daily Double!
Phase 2 -- Initial Growth
The initial growth phase can be felt to begin when the company has
completed the development of a product line and has sufficient sales to
justify an expectation of rapid growth. The phase may be regarded to end
when the company has lived up to such expectations and demonstrated a
capability to operate profitably and grow quickly. During this phase the
company matures somewhat. It begins to work on product quality and on
lowering unit costs. Although gaining new customers it is also beginning to
III
6face some competition from other small firms and sometimes from large
corporations as well, giving the young company strong incentives to develop
new products. The company is operating profitably, but the resultant cash
flows are typically insufficient to supply the needed growth capital.
The problems which the firm faces are also changing. Plant and
equipment are needed. Working capital needs are expanding with the growth
in sales. Key management personnel are needed as production, sales and
marketing, and research and development become important functional areas.
Management and operations control become important to keep the company
operating efficiently.
The type of financial backers which the firm attracts tends to change
with the company's characteristics. The risk and uncertainty associated with
the company decrease. The young company still offers the opportunity for a
large payoff, but the probability of failure, though still large, has decreased
significantly. The investment need not be locked in for more than two to
three years, if the founders are willing and the financial market permits the
company to go public or to be sold to a larger firm during these next few
years. The company no longer needs a gambler to supply capital, but phase
two investors must still be speculators over the long term.
Phase 3 -- Sustained Growth
Having solved its initial start-up and early growth problems, the
successful company emerges as a growth business. It has annual sales in the
millions of dollars and employment numbers in the hundreds. The enterprise
begins to face many of the problems of the large corporation but on a smaller
scale. The firm serves many customers with a variety of products and
services and is faced with strong competition. Profits and cash flows are
sufficient to meet the majority of its capital requirements, but new growth
possibilities are continually being presented. Indeed, growth rate of the
company may be the source of its most serious challenges, including financing
the growth.
The major problems facing the entrepreneur change significantly during
phase three; he is now required to think about overall corporate direction,
development of multiple product lines, employee morale, communications,
and long range planning. Potential merger or acquisition candidates present
themselves; and the company itself is courted by larger corporations. Tax and
legal considerations loom increasingly large. The entrepreneur may find
himself no longer the central figure of the company and he may wish to sell
his interest and retire or start over again. The company has ceased to be a
new enterprise and has become a growth business, maybe the IBM of the
future!
Despite, indeed perhaps because of, its speculative future prospects,
the company has undoubtedly become attractive to the public. If it had not
previously issued stock publicly, it can now turn to the public financial
markets with some degree of confidence. Long term loans are now also
available since the company has sufficient assets to serve as collateral. The
technological enterprise, through its ingenuity, efforts, persistence and good
luck, has stood the test of time and established itself as a going concern.
FINANCIAL SOURCES
A wide variety of financial sources are potentially available to fund the
technology-based company's capital requirements through the successive
stages of its growth and development. But embryonic technological
enterprises are quite different from most other new firms in their lack of
tangible resources. Many research- or technology-based companies start out
with little more resources than an oscilloscope and a soldering gun or a
magnifying glass. Many begin with only the entrepreneur's intelligence and
drive as inventory. With little else for collateral, the entrepreneur's
searches for funds from banks and other formal financial institutions are also
often fruitless. Alternatively, the term "venture capital" often comes to mind
when thinking of the initial financing of new enterprises. And yet, it has long
been true 1 (and still is!) that the bulk of financiers known as "venture
capitalists" do not support the earliest stage of capital acquisition for the
vast majority of technology-based enterprises. As we shall later show,
venture capitalists generally prefer later-stage investments in growing
enterprises, not early-stage investments in technological start-ups.
1 Historical evidence of this is indicated as far back as thirty years ago in
Rubenstein, 1958.
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8But if not the venture capitalist, then to whom does the entrepreneur
turn for funds to finance his dreams? Although initial requirements may be
low, who is willing to gamble on the start-up's success? And once the future
begins to look promising, where can the entrepreneur find several hundred
thousand to a few million dollars of growth capital? The many classes of
potential financiers for new technical enterprises will be examined here in an
effort to determine their resources, attitudes toward risk, selection criteria,
preferred investment terms, and post-investment relationships with the
young technical firm. I will consider them in the order of their general
likelihood of being an initial investor in the new firm.
Personal Savings
Undoubtedly the most available source of capital to the entrepreneur is
his personal savings. Indeed, Dunkelberg and Cooper (1983) had found
personal savings to be the primary source of financing for 890 owner-started
firms in a wide variety of mostly non-technical industries. Tyebjee and
Bruno (1982) indicated similar dominance of personal savings in the funding
of 185 California technology-oriented companies. However, those savings are
typically quite limited and the average individual scientist or engineer in his
early 30s would have difficulty in raising more than $25,000 to $50,000 on
the strength of his savings account, his signature, and his available
collateral. The entrepreneur must realize though that he may be required by
other investors to gamble much of his own assets on his company as a sign of
good faith. It is especially important that he and his co-founders own the
bulk of the company initially, as later dilution of their ownership will
necessarily follow from the required acceptance of increasing amounts of
outside capital. The entrepreneur should recognize that his potential capital
gain is phenomenal if the company proves successful and that he should be
risking much of his own "wealth" if the future looks bright.
Personal savings then are the foundation of initial capital. Usually
additional funds are not needed for close to a year or more, depending on the
scale of initial efforts. The entrepreneur can make many non-monetary forms
of investment in the company in the form of patents, developed products, and
free labor, previously referred to as "sweat equity". However, the assets of
the entrepreneur are all too soon exhausted and he must turn to outsiders for
9capital. If the entrepreneur is personally wealthy, from birth or from
previous entrepreneurial success, the need for outsider investments may be
delayed significantly.
Family and Friends
Next to personal savings the assets of an entrepreneur's relatives and
friends are probably most available. Such investments often take the form of
short term loans, although the loans may later be changed into "equity"
investments at the insistence of subsequent investors. The main advantage of
such funds is that they are relatively easy to get. The investors know the
entrepreneur and have assessed his capabilities. Often the entrepreneur,
unsure of whether his venture will succeed, properly feels reluctant to "take
advantage" of such close personal relationships to raise money. The major
disadvantage if friends and relatives do invest is that they may feel that the
investment gives them the right to advise or actively interfere with
management. Therefore, although such "naive" money is relatively easy to
obtain, many problems may result from its acceptance.
Private Individual Investors, or "Angels"
The great majority of initial investing through outside investors has
traditionally been undertaken by wealthy individuals. Gordon Baty long ago
(1964) characterized the traditional private venture capitalist as having a
tax bracket favoring capital gains. Furthermore, being "accountable only to
himself for his actions, he can afford the inevitable loss and he often has
motivations for investing which are not strictly economic". Non-economic
motivations include a sense of gambling, participation in an exciting growth
company, especially the involvement with young bright people, and sometimes
satisfying his sense of social responsibility, perhaps related to his wealth.
Unfortunately the current lack of tax differences between regular income and
capital gains obviously to at least some extent affects this individual's
motives and actions.
The private individual seldom seeks out investments. Instead he learns
of opportunities from contacts within the financial community of which he is
often a member. Investment bankers, commercial bankers and brokers all
refer companies to him. Occasionally the prospective individual investor
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participates in local groups like the MIT Enterprise Forum, where early-stage
entrepreneurs present their aspirations and problems.
William Wetzel (1983) has carefully analyzed this informal risk capital
investor, whom he calls a "business angel". The angel's resources are
considerable. Acting alone or through a syndicate of friends and
acquaintances he can raise as much as $1,000,000 for a given deal, although
he seldom does. A large fraction of the deals are for $50,000 to $200,000,
typically involving an angel and one or more of his friends, each putting up
$50,000 or less. They usually do not seek a controlling interest or
management position in the company, but most prefer to be consulted on
major management decisions.
Such investors rely heavily on the advice of their friends and other
backers when making investment decisions. Few make a detailed analysis of
the situation, evaluating the company primarily on the basis of its
management. The investments are usually straight equity. The wealthy
individual venture capitalist thus tends to qualify as the type investor needed
in the company's initial phase. The entrepreneur need only find the right angel
for his company; this is not easy, despite the computerized "matching
network" created by Wetzel for informal investors in the New England area
and now also replicated elsewhere in the United States.
Wealthy Family Venture Capital Groups
More-or-less next in line, at least historically, in likelihood of
investing at the outset of a technological enterprise is the formal private
venture capital investment group established by a wealthy family. Shortly
after World War II several wealthy families created such organizations to
invest family resources in young businesses, especially those based on
advanced technologies, in search of capital gains. The largest of these
groups, led by such people as Laurance Rockefeller, Jock Whitney, and Payson
and Trask, became well-known within the investing community and
instrumental in funding numerous technological enterprises. Rather than
invest informally and as individuals (as the "angels" above) those families
usually funded an autonomous investing organ (corporation or partnership),
managed by a staff of full-time employees who analyze incoming investment
proposals, make the investment decisions (usually without family
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participation in the decision), and work with the investee companies during
the post-investment period. Venrock, founded by the Rockefeller family, is
perhaps the best known of the current survivors of these organizations.
As these family groups developed they evolved a certain style of
operations that became the basis for today's U.S. venture capital industry,
with resulting advantages and disadvantages to the entrepreneur who deals
with them. The advantages to an entrepreneur who gets funds from such
family groups are many. Other investors look more favorably at the new
company because these larger family groups have a reputation for choosing
only the best companies. This of course makes it easier to obtain additional
capital later. Their resources are essentially unlimited, making it possible
for the entrepreneur to come back later for more capital. The staffs of such
family groups have had top quality reputations, with both business and
technical expertise. The final advantage is that they are patient investors,
willing to wait five or ten years for their returns, and they do not have to
answer to stockholders or outside investors for their performance.
The disadvantages associated with investments by the organized family
groups are also numerous. They have been very discriminating in choosing
their investments, investing typically in less than 1% of the proposals they
receive; the entrepreneur must submit a detailed proposal (called a "business
plan") to be considered. The investors will demand one or more positions on
the board of directors of the company and detailed ongoing reports of
operations. They may insist on placing a staff member in an operating
position in the company if growth does not materialize, or even worse from
the entrepreneur's perspective,they may step in and replace the founding
entrepreneurial head of the company. They are also rather slow in reaching a
decision, so the entrepreneur must approach them several months before he
needs the money.
In evaluating a young company the aspect that seemed to loom most
important to these family groups during their early and formative years was
the quality of the management, followed by the market for the product. They
also considered the state of product development and the underlying
technology. Investments were usually made in the form of convertible
debentures, providing some modicum of investor protection in the event of
company liquidation. The size of their investments tended to range in their
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early years between $300,000 and $500,000 and of course have grown in
magnitude over the past forty years, but not by more than about a factor of
two. The family venture capitalists often avoided initial financing, but now
tend to be willing to put in small sums as early-stage investments,
especially in companies headed by entrepreneurs with whom they have had
prior experience.
Venture Capital Funds
The family venture capital groups were the models for the formation of
specialized closed-end investment companies that focused on venture capital.
The first of these was American Research and Development Corporation
.(ARD), organized in Boston in 1946 in large part through the efforts of the
then Chairman of MIT, Karl T. Compton, and a number of prominent alumni and
friends of MIT, to move research and technological ideas forward into the
market. The heads of MIT's Departments of Chemical Engineering and
Aeronautical Engineering acted as advisors, and the Treasurer of MIT served
as Treasurer of ARD. ARD was funded initially with $3.4 million in
investments from Boston-area insurance companies, but joined as investors
by MIT, Harvard, Rice Institute and the University of Rochester. ARD later
went public, sold out still later to become a division of Textron Corporation,
and finally was sold by Textron to a member of the Mellon family.
Initially and for several years ARD invested in ideas promoted by senior
MIT faculty, housing the start-up companies in MIT buildings with a unique
cost-sharing arrangement that only today is beginning to be replicated at
other universities. This approach led to formation of and ARD investments in
such companies as High Voltage' Engineering and onics. Gradually ARD's
approach changed under the guidance of Georges Doriot, a professor at the
Harvard Business School who served as president of ARD, and who moved ARD
toward imitation of the larger family groups in almost every respect. A
full-time staff of professionals annually screened hundreds of incoming
proposals, giving careful consideration to perhaps ten percent of them, and
eventually investing in two to three percent of the companies. In its early
days ARD usually took dominant stock ownership position in a company
through an investment of $100,000 to $500,000 in the form of convertible
debentures, with $200,000 buying 80 percent of High Voltage in 1946 and
$100,000 gaining 75 percent of onics in 1948. Its principal success by far
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was the $70,000 start-up investment in 1957 that purchased 78 percent of
Digital Equipment Corporation, that success dwarfing all other actions ever
taken by ARD. ARD's attitudes and policies toward company management were
very similar to those of the family investment groups.
Following the lead of pioneers like ARD other professionally-managed
venture capital funds were formed, usually raising their money privately from
wealthy individuals, banks, pension funds and corporations. Whereas ARD had
strong bias toward companies located in the greater Boston area, funds were
formed in other parts of the United States with tendencies toward regional
biases, such as those managed by Arthur Rock in the Silicon Valley area.
Gradually these professional funds proliferated and came to dominate the
venture capital sector, becoming far larger in magnitude of total funds
managed and invested than the earlier-formed wealthy family funds. Funds
such as TA Associates, Hambrecht and Quist, Kleiner Perkins and many others
became well-known for technology-oriented investments in particular. In
general these funds followed patterns of investment analysis,
decision-making and management similar to those practiced first by the
family funds and then ARD. Careful screening and selectivity characterized
their investments, with aspirations toward high rates of potential return to
compensate their investors for the presumably high risks being taken. In
recent years this initially U.S. phenomenon has spread globally and venture
capital funds interested in investing in technology-based firms now exist
throughout western Europe and Asia, albeit sometimes with different
operating styles.
Among the hundreds of venture capital funds is a small group of
so-called "seed funds", like the Zero Stage Capital Equity Funds with which I
am associated, that focus on investments primarily in the initial and early
stages of technology-based firms. These "seed" or "zero stage" funds follow
in the tradition of the earliest activities of the wealthy families and of ARD
in helping to put together the startup enterprises, working very closely with
the company founders to round out their team, more sharply define their
business objectives, help develop a completed business plan, providing
possibly more value in advice and "sleeves rolled up" assistance than in the
capital itself. Such funds typically invest from $200,000 to $500,000 at the
initial stage of a new company, with perhaps matching funds available for
participation in a later second round of financing. The seed funds seldom have
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"deep pockets", and seek kindred spirits for sharing the initial investment so
as to ease the difficulties that might be experienced later in securing the
hopefully much larger requirements of growth financing. One unique seed fund
that has helped many Massachusetts startups is the Massachusetts
Technology Development Corporation (MTDC), state chartered and funded
during a period of low public availability of venture capital. It works very
closely and effectively with other Boston-area seed funds to help initiate and
enhance early growth of local technical firms.
Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs)
A special form of venture capital fund that was important in the U.S.
during the early 1960s was the SBIC, enacted by Congress in the 1958 Small
Business Investment Act. Private capital was given tax incentives and low
interest leveraged loans from the U.S. government to invest in small business.
Several hundred SBICs were chartered with combined assets of nearly $1
billion, but only 50 of them had assets greater than $1 million. The resulting
generally small financial organizations invested heavily in real estate and the
trade sector, with some of the larger ones investing in new technical
companies. About 15 to 20 percent of the SBIC investments were made in
early-stage companies that were less than one year old. But probably less
than ten percent of the SBIC capital was invested in technologically-oriented
companies. Overall, however, the SBICs did have significant impact by the
principal fact of their funds availability during a period of time that was
otherwise relatively dry of small business investing resources. Most of them
are now out of business although some associated with banks, such as Bank of
Boston Ventures, today are still active and important participants in
investments in early stage technology-based firms.
Non-Financial Corporations
Beginning in the early 1960s and increasing significantly only in the
1980s, major manufacturing firms have become interested in supplying
venture capital to young technological companies. Many of them are seeking
to supplement their in-house research and development efforts by backing
entrepreneurs in hopes of gaining access both to technology and engineering
talent. Initially companies such as DuPont, Ford, Texas Instruments and Union
Carbide experimented with this approach of direct venture capital investment
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in new or early stage companies. Later Exxon, Inco, Lubrizol and Monsanto
demonstrated active and effective programs of investment that encouraged
widespread participation by many Fortune 500 corporations.
Non-financial corporations differ significantly from the previously
discussed venture capitalists in regard to their motivations, selection
criteria and attitudes toward the technological enterprise. Their prime
consideration is usually technology. Most investing firms choose only a few
technical fields in which to invest, sometimes related or complementary to
their current lines of business, at other times wholly unrelated, depending
upon the corporation's present strategy of concentration or diversification.
The quality of the entrepreneurial team is usually the second most important
decision criterion. They have tended to avoid providing initial capital, often
because they do not see the opportunities soon enough or because they cannot
act fast enough, instead preferring somewhat later growth financing. In
recent years this tendency has changed somewhat, especially in areas of
medical technology and advanced materials, where a number of non-financial
corporations have developed close ties to venture capitalists that allow the
corporations to see and participate in early stage financings.
The non-financial firms often are willing to provide technical,
marketing and managerial assistance to the companies in which they invest,
potentially more valuable than the funds themselves if these services can be
accessed and utilized effectively by the investee. This assistance, which in
earlier writings I have labelled "venture nurturing" (Roberts, 1980), plus very
"deep pockets", may be primary advantages provided by the corporate venture
capitalist, but combines with some potential disadvantages. The corporation
may have a tendency to interfere more in the day-to-day operations of the
young firm than the entrepreneurs find desireable. Furthermore, the
corporate investor may oppose the firm "going public", preferring to merge it
eventually into its own operations. Entrepreneurs often think that going
public is the ultimate measure of and route to personal glory and financial
success, but the facts are that far more technical companies eventually sell
out to larger companies than go public. Thus the entrepreneur frequently is
leery of corporate funding at early stages of the firm but becomes less naive
and resistant to their funds and help as his company moves forward.
Commercial Banks
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In some areas of the U.S. commercial banks have taken an active role in
supplying capital to new technical enterprises, even though the bank itself is
restricted by regulations in how it can invest its resources. During the early
years of a company the more venturesome banks supply short term loans
secured by projected accounts receivable based on contracts or orders
received by the firm. These sometimes can get converted effectively into
intermediate or even long term loans through constant renewals and
renegotiation. Banks can also help through long-term lease financing of
laboratory or manufacturing equipment. Bank-owned SBICs, discussed above,
can of course become direct investors and the SBICs and/or bank commercial
lending officers can assist in establishing relationships with conventional
venture capital funds.
The bank's motives for its lending, investing and referral activities are
future profits to be generated through regular banking business with a
growing corporation. By helping to finance the firm when it is young the bank
hopes to retain the company's conventional banking business when the
company becomes large and successful. Thus the bank's attitudes and
patience may well differ from other potential investors.
Public Stock Issues
During several short periods of time since the early 1960s the start-up
entrepreneur could turn even initially to the public market in the United
States for very early-stage capital, especially for a high-tech or otherwise
"glamorous" company. Although few people active today in venture financing
will remember, 1969 was the peak year to date (!!) for initial public offerings
by early-stage companies. But those speculative times are usually
short-lived. In contrast when a more conservative mood prevails, especially
in "bear market" conditions, it becomes very difficult, certainly very costly,
for even the successful growing new enterprise to raise public funds.
There are many reasons for a young technical company to go public. The
entrepreneur and the venture capital backers may wish to realize capital
gains; the entrepreneur may want a public market to insure that his holdings
will be liquid if he should die; the new enterprise may want the prestige of
being listed on the financial pages of the newspaper. Or, specifically relevant
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to our current discussion of the financial base of the company, the company
may find that the public market will supply the least expensive or otherwise
most attractive funds for its further growth and development.
Regardless of the motivations the entrepreneur needs expert advice
from the financial community before attempting a public stock issue. The U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has extensive and complex
requirements that affect the process of "going public", as do many state
regulatory bodies. There are several different ways for a U.S. firm to raise
public money, including both underwritten and non-underwritten methods, and
in recent years including the possibility of going public in Britain.
Underwriters vary greatly in criteria and effectiveness, and need to be
carefully evaluated by the entrepreneur. Large investment banking houses, for
example, seldom underwrite issues of less than $10,000,000 and then usually
only when the firm meets other performance criteria. Thus early-stage
entrepreneurs need to deal with the smaller underwriters, with whom greater
caution is recommended. Consequently the public markets typically serve the
technical firm's growth capital financial needs, and not earlier requirements.
Synopsis
Figure 1 portrays the relationship of the stage of evolution of the
technology-based firm to the likely availability of capital from the various
investment sources discussed above. As such it constitutes a loose set of
testable hypotheses with respect to the sources of initial capital for the
technological firm. The diagram is inexact and is meant to convey the
average tendencies of each class of investor during the three stages of a
company's development. As should be expected the investment behavior of
each group contains considerable variance, to be evidenced by the
presentation of empirical findings that follows.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
This synopsis of initial capital sources has not included any mention of
pension funds or insurance companies, both major participants in U.S. capital
markets. In fact, with few exceptions neither of these types of institution
directly participates in initial or even early round financing of high-tech
firms. But both sources have become major investors in the pooled funds
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managed by venture capital firms, a fraction of which do directly invest as
described above. Corporate pension funds have been major players since 1981
and public employee retirement funds have become active since then. In
recent years over 20 states have become involved in venture capital fund
investments, often with the combined motives of economic stimulus of their
own regions as well as increased returns on their investment portfolios. In
addition, both pension funds and insurance companies often invest in the later
growth financing of technical companies, with some of the insurance
companies aggressively managing their own direct investment portfolios.
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION
The data analyzed here in order to test the rough hypotheses presented
above are part of a twenty years research program on all aspects of the
formation and growth of high-technology new enterprises, including more
than 40 separate but related research studies. Elements of the data collected
in thirteen of those studies (shown in Table 1) are used in part in this article,
covering information from several hundred firms founded by former
employees of MIT major laboratories and engineering departments as well as
the former employees of a government laboratory, a major non-profit systems
engineering organization and two large technological corporations. The four
non-MIT organizations were selected from the Greater Boston area for ease of
data collection, seeking comparability with the size and nature of work of the
MIT "sources". Contrasting information is used occasionally from a study of
new non-technical consumer-oriented manufacturing firms, as well as from
other studies within the overall research program.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Beginning with strong cooperation of senior managers in each source
organization, initial lists were developed of suggested names of spin-off
entrepreneurs from that organization. Follow-up interviews were used to
screen these lists for inappropriate names as well as to generate further
suggestions in a "snowball" sample creation process. Rigorous criteria were
applied to include only those who had been former full-time employees of the
source organizations, who later participated as founders of wholly-new
for-profit companies. (As very few female entrepreneurs were found in these
samples of technical entrepreneurs, the male pronoun will be used in the
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remainder of this article in referring to the entrepreneurs.)
Structured interviews with a detailed questionnaire, lasting typically
one to two and one-half hours, were used to gather data from each
entrepreneur personally, with telephone interviews used in less than ten
percent of the cases and mailed interviews used only as a last resort in less
than one percent of the cases. Some interviews stretched to seven or eight
hours over two or three sessions! Despite extensive efforts to include all
spin-offs from each source organization studied, no doubt some minor bias
has crept into the sample of companies studied in that it is likely that any
companies not located were less successful than those traced. The bias did
not prevent many companies from being found and studied that were clearly
failures or not very successful.
Answers to the detailed questionnaires led easily to the quantification
of information. Most all of the answers were coded and arranged in computer
data files. Incomplete information on some of the companies does not
particularly affect the data analysis as relevant codes were given to isolate
missing information.
THE INITIAL CAPITAL BASE
Amount and Source
Many entrepreneurs begin their companies with a minimal amount of
initial capital and often find their operations hampered by a shortage of
capital. Other entrepreneurs, perhaps wiser or just monetarily more
fortunate, raise substantial funds before beginning their ventures and have
their operations proceed relatively free of financial constraints.
Figure 2 presents the distribution of initial capital of 113 new
technology-based companies spun-off from MIT departments and laboratories.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Twenty-three percent of these companies (26) were begun with funds of less
than one thousand dollars. Almost half began with less than $10,000. Only
twenty-two percent (25) began with funds equal to or in excess of fifty
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thousand dollars, of which the vast majority (20 out of 25) began operations
on a full-time basis.
A separate sample of new companies, the 38 spin-off firms from a large
electronic systems company, had similar initial funding: 18 percent with less
than one thousand dollars; 42 percent with less than $10,000; only 18 percent
with more than fifty thousand dollars. And twenty three spin-offs from a
large technologically diversified corporation had somewhat higher but still
small average startup equity of $67,000.
In regard to initial funding the consumer-oriented manufacturing firms
we studied also had modest beginnings, over half of them starting with less
than $10,000. Rather remarkably, clusters of companies incorporated ten
years apart experienced the same distribution of initial capital, with a
median of $15,000. The precise amounts of initial capital for 154 companies
in our samples ranged from zero dollars for several firms to one company's
$900,000. Close to half of these firms started on a part-time basis. Of 52
firms begun on a part-time basis that provided financing data, 58 percent
started with less than $10,000 while only 38 percent of the full-time
operations began with so little.
As reported in Table 2 personal funds of the founders were the primary
sources used to finance the start of over seventy percent of these companies,
and family and friends were key contributors to the start of an additional five
percent. These percentages were consistent across all subgroups of MIT
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
spin-off companies, as well as those from a large electronic systems
company and from a sample of entrepreneurial firms whose early years were
carefully assessed. Similar personal or "close" sources funded 20 out of 23
companies spun-off from a large diversified corporation, as well as 80
percent of the consumer-oriented manufacturers. The other companies were
begun through funds obtained primarily from private investors or "angels",
venture capital firms or non-financial corporations at which the founders
worked, with a few funded by the public stock market. We found these same
two sources, the founders themselves and private investors, to be the
dominant initial financiers of a sample of 21 companies which were carefully
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evaluated for later funding by one venture capital firm we studied.
Those starting on a part-time basis were even more likely to use their
own personal funds to finance the early years of the company. (Query, not
answerable from the data: Is the direction of causality here really the other
way? Did the lack of outside capital support force the entrepreneur to utilize
his own limited personal resources and thus restrict him to starting on a
part-time basis only?)
As anticipated in the discussion above no equity capital was supplied by
commercial banks, but bank credit came early and frequently into these
companies. Many of the companies had early sales by contract to government
or large industrial organizations, and the banks often granted loans to these
firms, attaching the contract payments as security.
In Table 3 the amounts of initial capital and their sources are shown in
detail for 110 new enterprises. The specific amounts of money provided by
the various categories of investors are obviously incidental to the specific
time periods at which these companies were incorporated and to some extent
to the specific industries in which they were involved. New biotechnology
companies, not included in this sample, would for example typically generate
far more initial capital than new software firms, of which several were in
this sample. But what is more important and persistent over time and
industry in my experience are the relative distributions of which sources are
actively involved at the outset of new technical firms, and which ones
provide more rather than less amounts of capital.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
The figures in Table 3 demonstrate empirically what might have been
assumed beforehand: In the relatively few cases where money was obtained
through "outside" forms of financing (those sources other than the founders or
their families or friends), those sources provided far greater average
amounts (.000). Of twenty-six firms begun with funds from outside sources,
twenty had initial capital equal to or in excess of $50,000. Of eighty-five
companies funded by personal or "close" money, only five were begun with
comparable amounts. Similar patterns were found in each of our research
clusters. For example, among the enterprises being assessed by a venture
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capitalist for "step-up" funding, those which had initially been self-financed
had started with considerably less initial capital (an average of $90,000)
than the companies funded by private individuals (an average initially of
$215,000) (p=0.02).
The primary reason for this difference is understandable. The amount of
money that the founders and their associates have is limited by the fact that
these are personal funds. Indeed some of the founders did have a healthy
personal stake from the sale of previous ventures, e.g., 5 of 21 self-funded
spin-offs from the MIT Instrumentation Lab, to cite an extreme case. But
most entrepreneurs used only accumulated savings from past earnings, not
from sales of prior companies. The "outside" financial sources by their nature
have a much greater supply of money available for investment in a
technological entrepreneurial startup.
The more basic question of why some entrepreneurs sought out and
received funds from outside sources and why other entrepreneurs either did
not seek or did not receive initial outside capital cannot be answered simply.
Some more insight will be provided in analyses of venture capitalist
decision-making that will be carried out later using our database. But three
possible answers to this question are apparent and all somewhat applicable:
(1) The need did not exist. (2) The desire for outside funds did not exist. (3)
The entrepreneurs were unable to obtain outside funds.
Analyses below will demonstrate that the need for initial funds varies
significantly among new enterprises as a function of their industry and type
of business, and indeed size of founding group, among other influences.
Clearly, many firms did not need outside financing. At the opposite end of the
spectrum, the general interviews and our several specific studies of venture
financing did reveal many failed attempts at raising capital by entrepreneurs
who ended up using only personal or family and friends funding. Some
entrepreneurs did not know how to go about seeking outside funding and used
their own monies as a default.
However, other entrepreneurs knew of the more formal sources, might
well in our judgment have been successful in gaining outside commitments,
but chose not to. Some entrepreneurs want little or no equity financing at the
outset because they wish to retain a maximum amount of ownership and
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control. They often seek primarily debt from outside sources, resulting
usually in relatively small loans because of the founders' limited net worth.
Then, in order to cope with the constraints of their limited funds, the
entrepreneurs gear their operations to reduce their need for funds, e.g., they
render a service instead of producing hardware or they tend to engage in
custom-oriented development and production that can be contracted with
larger firms or government agencies. The contracts provide advances and/or
progress payments that minimize additional financial requirements. One
small study provided statistical support for this explanation, demonstrating
that the entrepreneurs who initially preferred debt to equity tended to
finance the companies themselves (0.015) and had lower initial capitalization
(0.11).
But several of the self-financing entrepreneurs seemed rather less
rational and more emotional in their emphatic opposition to sharing the
profits of their labors and their ideas with others "who did nothing more than
provide money"! Not understanding that initial capital for a high-technology
company is a very risky investment, such entrepreneurs repeatedly cite
venture capitalists as "vultures" who want something for nothing. Underlying
this rather naive and often angry opposition, and also involved with many
other aspects of financing, are a complexity of motivations that I cannot even
attempt to explain.
On occasion, naivete about sources of finance produced unusual
problems, as in the case of one firm financed by a group of "bookies" who had
funds available due to a temporary crackdown on bookmaking activities. The
bookmakers wanted their money back three years later, just when the
enterprise really needed the funds to finance expansion. As a result this
company literally was forced out of business.
The data analyses reveal that those individuals with the greatest
amount of commercial work experience started their companies with more
initial phase capital financing (.08). These individuals, by virtue of their
more extensive familiarity with the industrial and financial community, were
probably more aware of venture capital sources and how to approach them
successfully. Their greater experience no doubt also provided some modicum
of comfort to the investors. Not necessarily in conflict with this finding is
that a significant fraction of entrepreneurs coming out of MIT labs and
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departments felt their previous association with MIT had aided their capital
seeking efforts.
Initial Capital and the Number of Founders
The number of founders can influence the amount of initial capital both
directly and indirectly. As the number of founders increases more personal
funds are available from which to draw money. This has a direct effect in
that over seventy percent of the companies we studied were financed initially
by personal funds. Indirectly, the more founders there are, the greater
possibility that one of them knows a receptive "outside" source. Furthermore,
multiple founders are likely to reflect a more substantial intended
undertaking, e.g. product development and manufacture rather than just
research or consulting. This implied need for greater funds both generates
and justifies its supply. And the larger team is itself likely to be more
impressive to outside sources, partly explaining our research finding that
outside sources are more willing to invest in multi-founder companies.
Table 4 presents the initial capital amounts associated with the number
of founders of 109 companies. The largest proportion of companies which
began with less than $10,000 (62.5%) was in the group of one-founder
companies. In general the larger the number of founders, the less the
occurrence of financing under $10,000 and the greater the occurrence of
funding in excess of $50,000.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
We carried out separate analyses of the companies begun primarily with
the entrepreneurs' own funds and those started with others' funds. Nearly
half of the firms founded by a single individual using his own money began
with less than $1000. In the founder-funded firms greater amounts of initial
capital were provided as the number of founders increased. (Tau=0.19, p=.03)
(Indeed, when Jack Pugh and I co-founded our consulting firm, Pugh-Roberts
Associates, Inc., we each invested $1000!) Looking across the entire sample
of companies, at each size of founding group the average amount of funds
supplied by others was greater than the average supplied by the founders
themselves. All but six of twenty-six companies which obtained funds
primarily from others were started by multi-founder teams. And for
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outsider-funded firms, the same finding holds that the number of founders
and the amount of initial capital received are positively related. (Tau=0.23,
p=.08)
Initial Capital and Specific Plans
Not all the entrepreneurs had specific plans for their companies when
they decided to start them. Twenty-four of fifty-three entrepreneurs (45%)
who responded to questioning indicated that they had neither specific short
term nor long term plans at the beginning of their companies. With no
specific plan considerable investment is not necessary. The Alice in
Wonderland adage applies here: If you don't care where you are going, any path
will get you there. Nor is an investment likely to be attracted from an
outside professionally managed financial source when the nature of the future
work is so uncertain.
In Table 5 the amounts of initial capital for twenty-nine firms started
with specific plans are compared with the amounts for twenty-three firms
started without specific plans. Seventy-four percent of those without
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
specific plans started with less than $10,000 whereas only 24 percent of the
companies with specific plans were formed with so little funding.
Furthermore, 38 percent of the companies begun by founders with specific
plans received funding in excess of $50,000 while only 9 percent of the
companies lacking specific plans had so much initial capital. Clearly
entrepreneurs with specific plans raised more initial capital than those
without plans. (.001)
As might be expected from the discussion thusfar the more institutional
sources of financing are much more inclined to support ventures which have a
specifically planned future. Table 6 shows that ten of twelve companies
which received other than personal or "close" funding had specific operational
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
plans at the start. Clearly investors see firms with plans as better bets. In
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addition the entrepreneurs who prepared detailed plans no doubt foresaw
needs for greater capital and went out to get it.
The two companies in this cluster that received outside funds despite
lack of specific plans are special exceptions. One was founded by several MIT
employees who had been left without work when MIT abandoned its atomic
energy research. These founders along with nearly ninety other MIT
employees engaged in the same work formed a company without specific
goals, but backed strongly by private investors, an investment that is easily
understood. The other situation involved a new company formed from the
division of a larger corporation, spun-off in its entirety due to rising costs.
The venture was backed by a public stock issue generated by the parent
company. Excluding these two unique cases only companies with specific
plans obtained money from the more sophisticated sources of financing.
Initial Capital and Product Initially
Information gathered from 110 firms indicated that forty-seven (43 %)
of them were based on specific products that had already been developed or
which the entrepreneurs planned to develop immediately. A firm dependent
upon a product needs capital, whether for product development or production
facilities or market launch. Such a firm would have difficulties getting
operations underway without substantial capital. Since the sixty-three other
firms in this grouping did not have a product or immediate product objectives,
they needed considerably less initial capital to get going.
Table 7 displays the amount of initial capital for forty-three companies
that had a product or specific product plans initially and for fifty-nine
companies that did not. The group with initial products were initially
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
financed to a greater extent. (.02) This situation is driven statistically by
the fact that twenty-one of these firms without product began with less than
$1000, while only three companies with products had similarly small initial
funding.
A product-oriented company's capital requirements do vary according to
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the nature of the product, its stage of development, development
requirements, its production process, as well as the demand for the product.
Among 21 firms in one of our samples those with a "proprietary" product (the
combination perhaps of "specific plans" and a product orientation!) had
significantly higher initial capitalization ($200,000 on average) than those
without a proprietary product ($129,000) (.07). But it is doubtful that capital
required would ever be much less than $1000. Indeed each of the three
product-oriented firms listed in Table 7 that had begun with less than $1000
was in the process of developing its first product, making its meager funding
slightly more understandable.
The distribution of initial capital within the group of spin-offs that
began without a product is readily explainable. Many of these companies were
initially engaged in activities such as technical consulting or computer
programming. Little or no financing was needed to start them. Others were
involved with work such as systems design and development, which required
capital primarily to support technical personnel and equipment. Here capital
needs varied, depending on the size of work to be done. There is a bit of the
chicken-versus-egg issue here. In some of these cases companies that had
problems in raising initial outside capital had already abandoned their earlier
intentions and started to do things that were not capital-intensive. Thus lack
of available initial capital often influenced the apparent lack of "initial"
product orientation!
No significant differences were observable in the sources of capital for
both groups. Thirty companies (70 percent) formed around a product were
financed by founders or close associates, while thirteen generated other
funds. Fifty-one companies (82 percent, slightly more than the above group)
without an initial product focus were funded by founders or family or friends,
while eleven received funds elsewhere.
Amount by Needs and Type of Business
Table 8 presents responses from 107 entrepreneurs who ranked their
needs for capital. They contain wide variances that reflect the types of
business entered. In hardware production capital is first needed for product
development, then for production facilities and working capital. Software
companies need working capital for their technical personnel payroll and to
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finance their accounts receivable (A/R), but they also need funds for
computer equipment and for product development work. Firms performing
contract research and development (R&D) exhibit needs for lab equipment,
product development, working capital and production facilities. Even
individual consultants need funds for lab equipment and to fund development
work.
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE
None of the groups found that either marketing expenses or production
and clerical workers placed a stress on their capital needs. The technological
enterprise unfortunately displays typically little emphasis on marketing.
Also the Boston area labor market, relevant to most of the firms studied, has
been especially efficient until recently in terms of a new company's ability to
find both skilled and semiskilled hourly workers.
Given the differences in specific needs how do the capital requirements
vary in amount by type of business? The consultants and the software houses
required the least capital; nearly 80 percent of them were capitalized
initially at less than $10,000. Indeed, one software entrepreneur started his
company on $700 he received from selling his automobile. At the opposite
extreme were the hardware production firms, but even here 84 percent were
capitalized at under $50,000. This relatively modest figure is explained in
part by the fact that sixty percent of those companies were started on a
part-time basis. Most of the companies found that their initial funds were
insufficient to support their growth during their early years. Sixty percent of
the companies sought capital a second time and nearly half sought funds a
third time, but this will be discussed in more detail in later writings.
SUMMARY
This article has presented an assessment of the capital market for
technology-based firms, focusing upon the links between the stages of
evolution of a firm and the investment preferences of various capital sources.
The review of these factors led to an expectation that initial capital will be
supplied most frequently by the entrepreneurs themselves from their own
savings, secondarily by their families and friends and by private investors,
all these being sources of capital outside of the formal channels. More
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substantial but still initial funding from rather unique "wealthy family
funds", special "seed" funds and somewhat more conventional venture capital
funds were expected to be the primary complements of the informal sources.
The data from our studies of technological firms support these
expectations, while also providing evidence of the usual small initial capital
base (almost half with less than $10,000) and the dominance of personal
savings as the principal source of initial capital (74 percent of the
companies). "Outside" sources of capital are responsible for the larger initial
investments when they occur. As listed in Table 9 larger amounts of initial
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE
capital are both contributed and raised by the larger groups of co-founders,
especially when the founders are involved in the companies from the outset
on a full-time basis. Specific plans for the company are associated with
greater initial capitalization, as well as with raising outside capital, as is
also true for the effect of having an initial product. The needs for initial
capital vary enormously by amount and intended use as a function of the type
of business being started, with consulting firms and software companies
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Table 1. Data Sources for Financing Study of New Technological EnterDrises*
New Companies Participants in
Sources of New Enterprises Identified Research Study
MIT major laboratories (4 studies) 107 96
MIT academic departments (5 studies) 74 60
Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratory 16 15
MITRE Corporation 5 5
Electronic systems company 45 39
Diversified technological company 58 23
Totals 305 238
* Among my former research assistants and thesis students who contributed
importantly to this phase of research were E.K. Bender, E.F. Briskman, F.L.
Buddenhagen, H.A. Cohen, D.A. Forseth, J. Goldstein, D.R. Hall, M.W. Klahr, D.H.
Peters, J.C. Ruth, C.L. Taylor and P.V. Teplitz, as well as my former research
associate Herbert A. Wainer.
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Table 2. Primary Source of Initial Capital (154 companies)
Source Number of Companies %
Personal Savings 114 74
Family and Friends 8 5
Private Individual Investors 11 7
Venture Capital Funds 8 5
Non-Financial Corporations 9 6
Commercial Banks 0 0
Public Stock Issues 4 3
154 100Totals
35
Table 3. Amount of Initial Capital by Source (110 companies)
Amount of Initial Capital ($ thousands)
Source <1 1-<10 10-<50 50-<100 100-<250 250-<500 500 Total
Personal Savings 22 27 27 1 3 0 0 80
Family and Friends 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 5
Private Investors 0 0 2 2 3 1 0 8
Venture Capital Fnds. 0 0 0 2 2 3 1 8
Non-Financial Corps. 1 0 2 1 1 1 2 8
Commercial Banks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Public Stock Issues 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
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Table 4. Amount of Initial Capital by Number of Founders (109 companies)
Number of Amount of Initial Capital ($ thousands)
Founders <1 1 -<10 10-<50 50-<1 00 100<250 250500 500
1 17 8 11 1 3 -
2 2 10 9 2 1 2 -
3 3 5 10 - 1 1 2
4 1 4 1 1 1
5 1 - 2 1 1 1






Kendall Tau= 0.25, p= 0.01
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* Mann-Whitney U, p=0.001
II
38




Personal Savings 15 19
Family and Friends 2 1
Private Investors 3 1
Venture Capital Funds 3 0
Non-Financial Corporations 3 0
Commercial Banks 0 0
Public Stock Issues 1 1
_1_·___11__1__1_1___ .
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* Mann-Whitney U, p=0.02
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Table 9. Initial Capital for the Technological Enterprise




Larger Initial Capital Associated with:
Full-time, rather than part-time, commitment
Larger co-founding team
"Outside" initial investors
Specific plans for business development
Initial product available or targeted
Hardware focus, rather than software or consulting
